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ABSTRACT
In many real-world problems, a team of agents need to collabo-
rate to maximize the common reward. Although existing works
formulate this problem into a centralized learning with decentral-
ized execution framework, which avoids the non-stationary prob-
lem in training, their decentralized execution paradigm limits the
agents’ capability to coordinate. Inspired by the concept of corre-
lated equilibrium, we propose to introduce a coordination signal to
address this limitation, and theoretically show that following mild
conditions, decentralized agents with the coordination signal can
coordinate their individual policies as manipulated by a centralized
controller. The idea of introducing coordination signal is to encap-
sulate coordinated strategies into the signals, and use the signals to
instruct the collaboration in decentralized execution. To encourage
agents to learn to exploit the coordination signal, we propose Sig-
nal Instructed Coordination (SIC), a novel coordination module that
can be integrated with most existing MARL frameworks. SIC casts
a common signal sampled from a pre-defined distribution to all
agents, and introduces an information-theoretic regularization to
facilitate the consistency between the observed signal and agents’
policies. Our experiments show that SIC consistently improves per-
formance over well-recognized MARL models in both matrix games
and a predator-prey game with high-dimensional strategy space.
KEYWORDS
multi-agent reinforcement learning, coordination
1 INTRODUCTION
Multi-agent interactions are common in real-world scenarios such
as traffic control [34], smartgrid management [37], packet routing
in networks [43], and social dilemmas [25]. Motivated by these
applications and inspired by the success of deep reinforcement
learning (DRL) in single-agent settings [33], there is a growing
interest in deep multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) [14, 17,
20, 31], which studies how the agents can learn to act strategically
by adopting RL algorithms.
In cooperative multi-agent environments, a straightforward ap-
proach is the fully centralized paradigm, where a centralized con-
troller is used to make decisions for all agents, and its policy is
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learned by applying successful single-agent RL algorithms. How-
ever, the fully centralizedmethod assumes an unlimited communica-
tion bandwidth, which is impractical in many real-world scenarios.
Besides, it suffers from exponential growth of the size of the joint
action space with the number of agents. Therefore, decentralized ex-
ecution approaches are proposed, including the fully decentralized
paradigm and the centralized learning with decentralized execution
(CLDE) [31, 35] paradigm. The fully decentralized method models
each participant as an individual agent with its own policy and
critic conditioned on local information. This setting fails to solve
the non-stationary environment problem [24, 32], and is empirically
deprecated by [15, 28]. In CLDE framework, agents can leverage
global information including the joint observations and actions of
all agents in the training stage, e.g., through training a centralized
critic, but the policy of an agent can only be dependent on the indi-
vidual information and thus they can behave in the decentralized
way in the execution stage. This training paradigm bypasses the
non-stationary problem [15, 28], and can lead to some coordination
among the cooperative agents empirically [31].
Despite the merits of CLDE, the feasible joint policy space with
distributed execution is much smaller than the joint policy space
with a centralized controller, limiting the agents’ capability to coor-
dinate. For example, in a two-agent traffic systemwith agents A and
B, whose individual action space is {go, stop}, we cannot find a joint
policy that satisfies P(A goes & B stops) = P(A stops & B goes) =
0.5 if both agents are making decisions independently. Previous
works [19, 22, 36, 39] adopts peer-to-peer communication mecha-
nism to facilitate coordination, but they require specially designed
communication channels to exchange information and the agents’
capability to coordinate is limited by the accessibility and the band-
width of the communication channel.
Inspired by the correlated equilibrium (CE) [2, 26] concept in
game theory, we introduce a coordination signal to allow for more
correlation of individual policies and to further facilitate coordina-
tion among cooperative agents in decentralized execution paradigms.
The coordination signal is conceptually similar to the signal sent by
a correlation device to induce CE. It is sampled from a distribution
at the beginning of each episode of the game and carries no state-
dependent information. After observing the same signal, different
agents learn to take corresponding individual actions to formu-
late an optimal joint action. Such coordination signal is of practical
importance. For example, the previous traffic system example can
introduce a traffic policeman that sends a public signal via his pose
to each agent. The type of the pose may be dependent on the current
time (state-free) as a traffic light is, but agents can still coordinate
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their actions without any explicit communication among them. In
addition, we prove that for a group of fully cooperative agents, if
the signal’s distribution satisfies some mild conditions, the joint
policy space is equal to the centralized joint policy space. Therefore,
the coordination signal expands the joint policy space while still
maintains the decentralized execution setting, and is helpful to find
a better joint policy.
To incentivize agents to make full use of the coordination signal,
we propose Signal Instructed Coordination (SIC), a novel plug-in
module for learning coordinated policies. In SIC, a continuous vec-
tor is sampled from a pre-defined normal distribution as the coor-
dination signal, and every agent observes the vector as an extra
input to its policy network. We introduce an information-theoretic
regularization, which maximizes the mutual information between
the signal and the resulting joint policy. We implement a centralized
neural network to optimize the variational lower bound [3, 7, 29]
of the mutual information. The effects of optimizing this regulariza-
tion are three-fold: it (i) encourages each agent to align its individual
policy with the coordination signal, (ii) decreases the uncertainty
of policies of other agents to alleviate the difficulty to coordinate,
and (iii) leads to a more diverse joint policy. Besides, SIC can be
easily incorporated with most models that follow the decentralized
execution paradigm, such as MADDPG [31] and COMA [17].
To evaluate SIC, we first conduct insightful experiments on a
multiplayer variant of matrix game Rock-Paper-Scissors-Well [38] to
demonstrate how SIC incentivize agents to coordinate in both one-
step and multi-step scenarios. Then we conduct experiments on
Predator-Prey, a classic game implemented in multi-agent particle
worlds [31]. We empirically show that by adopting SIC, agents learn
to coordinate by interpreting the signal differently and thus achieve
better performance. Besides, the visualization of the distribution of
collision positions in Predator-Prey provides evidence that SIC im-
proves the diversity of policies. An additional parameter sensitivity
analysis manifests that SIC introduces stable improvement.
2 METHODS
In this section, we formally propose our model. We first provide
the background for multi-agent reinforcement learning. Then we
analyze the superiority of signal instructed approach over previous
paradigms. Finally, we introduce Signal Instructed Coordination
(SIC) and its implementation details.
2.1 Preliminaries
We consider a fully cooperative multi-agent game with N agents.
The game can be described as a tuple as ⟨I,S,A,T , r ,γ , ρ0⟩. Let
I = {1, 2, · · · ,n} denote the set ofn agents.A = ⟨A1,A2, · · · ,An⟩
is the joint action space of agents, and S is the global state space.
At time step t , the group of agents takes the joint action at =
⟨a1t ,a2t , · · · ,ant ⟩ with each ait ∈ Ai indicating the action taken
by the agent i . T (st+1 |st , at ) : S × A × S → [0, 1] is the state
transition function. r (st , at ) : S × A → R indicates the reward
function from the environment. γ ∈ [0, 1) is a discount factor and
ρ0 : S → [0, 1] is the distribution of the initial state s0.
Let πi (ait |st ) : S × Ai → [0, 1] be a stochastic policy for agent
i , and denote the joint policy of agents as π = ⟨π1,π2, · · · ,πn⟩ ∈ Π
where Π is the joint policy space. Let J (π ) = Eπ
[∑∞
t=0 γ
t rt
]
de-
notes the expected discounted sum of rewards, where rt is the
reward received in time-step t following policy π . We aim to opti-
mize the joint policy π to maximize J (π ).
In this paper, we also consider environments with opponent
agents. However, we focus on promoting cooperation among the
controllable agents and regard the opponent agents as a part of the
environment.
2.2 Joint Policy Space with Coordination Signal
In the fully centralized paradigm, a centralized controller is used to
manipulate a group of agents. We denote ΠC as the policy space
of the centralized controller and πC : S × A → [0, 1] as a joint
policy in ΠC . In the decentralized execution paradigm, the agents
make decisions independently according to their individual policies
πDi : S × Ai → [0, 1]. We define the policy space of agent i as ΠDi
and the joint policy space as ΠD = ΠD1 × ΠD2 × · · · × ΠDn , i.e. the
Cartesian product of the policy spaces of each agent. For a joint
policy πD ∈ ΠD , we have πD (a |s) = πD1 (a1 |s) · πD2 (a2 |s) · · · · ·
πDn (an |s), ∀s ∈ S and ∀a = ⟨a1,a2, · · · ,an⟩ ∈ A. We conclude the
relation between ΠC and ΠD as the following theorem.
Theorem 2.1. ΠD is a subset of ΠC .
Proof. For ∀πD ∈ ΠD , we can construct πC ∈ ΠC , which
suffices that for ∀s ∈ S, ∀a = ⟨a1,a2, · · · ,an⟩ ∈ A,
πC (a |s) = πD1 (a1 |s) · πD2 (a2 |s) · · · · · πDn (an |s) = πD (a |s),
i.e. πC = πD . Therefore, we have πD ∈ ΠC and ΠD ⊆ ΠC . □
We use a counterexample to show that not every joint policy in
ΠC is an element of ΠD . In a two-agent system where each agent
has two actions x and y, ∀s ∈ S, ∃πC ∈ ΠC that suffices
πC (⟨a1 = x ,a2 = x⟩|s) = πC (⟨a1 = y,a2 = y⟩|s) = 0.5,
but πC < ΠD , because there is no valid solution for
π1(a1 = x |s) · π2(a2 = x |s)
= π1(a1 = y |s) · π2(a2 = y |s)
= (1 − π1(a1 = x |s)) · (1 − π2(a2 = x |s))
= 0.5. (1)
Since ΠC includes ΠD , the best joint policy in ΠC is superior or
equal to the best joint policy in ΠD . However, due to computational
complexity concerns, the decentralized execution paradigm is more
practical in large-scale environments. Taking into account the supe-
riorities of both centralized and decentralized paradigms, we have
motivation to propose a new framework which has centralized
policy space ΠC and is executed in a decentralized way.
From a game-theoretic perspective, the decentralized agents try
to reach a Nash equilibrium (NE), with each individual policy as a
best response to others’ policies. Previous studies on computational
game theory show that by following the signal provided by a corre-
lation device, agents may reach a more general type of equilibrium,
correlated equilibrium (CE) [26], which can potentially lead to better
outcomes for all agents [1, 2, 13, 21]. Inspired by CE, we propose a
signal instructed framework, which provides a larger equilibrium
space and maintains the decentralized execution scheme for ease of
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Figure 1: The relationship among ΠC , ΠD and ΠS is ΠC =
ΠS ⊇ ΠD . The white circle represents an element in the set.
training. We introduces a coordination signal sent to every agent at
the beginning of a game, which is conceptually close to the signal
sent by the correlation device in CE.
The usage of the signal changes ΠC to a different joint policy
space, ΠS . Every agent observes the same signal z ∈ Z sampled
from a distribution Pz , where Z is the signal space, and learns
an individual policy as πSi (ai |s, z). Therefore, the agents formu-
late a special joint policy, πS , which suffices that ∀s ∈ S, ∀a =
{a1,a2, · · · ,an } ∈ A, and ∀z ∈ Z, πS (a, z |s) = Pz (z) ·πS1 (a1 |s, z) ·
πS2 (a2 |s, z) · · · · · πSn (an |s, z). πS is a conditional joint distribution
of a and z, and differs from aforementioned types of joint policies.
However, by regarding z as an extension of global state, we do
not change the way we model the individual policy of each agent,
which is still πSi (ai |s ′) with s ′ = (s, z).
In signal instructed approach, all agents observe the same z, and
we assume that every agent follows the instruction of z, i.e., takes
only one specific corresponding action azi . In other words, every
agent’s policy is
πi (ai |s, z) =
{
1 ai = azi
0 otherwise.
We denote the corresponding joint action as az = {az1 ,az2 , · · · ,azn }.
Intuitively, this assumption is like that agents make an “agreement”
on which joint action to take in current state when observing z,
which is common in real-world scenarios. For example, in a traffic
junction, a traffic policeman standing in the center directs the traffic
by posing to cars in all directions. The cars can tell whether they
should accelerate or stop from the same observed pose, even if the
policeman changes his pose in accord to time (state-free). The agents
can be regarded as reaching a CE. Following the assumption still
results in a stochastic joint policy, with the stochasticity conditioned
on z now. With this assumption, we derive Theorem 2.2.
Theorem 2.2. ΠS is equal to ΠC .
Proof. We prove this theorem in two steps:
(1) ΠS ⊇ ΠC : ∀πC ∈ ΠC , we can construct π ∈ ΠS , which
suffices that ∀s ∈ S, ∀a = {a1,a2, · · · ,an } ∈ A, we assign
a signal z ∈ Z to a with Pz (z) = πC (a |s), s.t.
π (z,a |s) = Pz (z)π (a |z, s)
= Pz (z)[π1(a1 |s, z) · π2(a2 |s, z) · · · · πn (an |s, z)]
= Pz (z)[1 · 1 · · · · · 1] = πC (a |s)
Therefore, we have π = πC ∈ ΠC . Since every joint policy
in ΠC is also an element of ΠS , we conclude that ΠS ⊇ ΠC .
(2) ΠS ⊆ ΠC : ∀πS ∈ ΠS , we can construct π ∈ ΠC , which
suffices that ∀s ∈ S, ∀a = {a1,a2, · · · ,an } ∈ A, ∀z ∈ Z,
π (a |s) =
{
Pz (z) a = az
0 otherwise.
Therefore, we have π = πS ∈ ΠS . Since every joint policy
in ΠS is also an element of ΠC , we conclude that ΠS ⊆ ΠC .
Given ΠS ⊆ ΠC and ΠS ⊇ ΠC , we conclude that ΠS = ΠC . □
This theorem shows that the signal instructed method enlarged
the joint policy space to the same size as ΠC . Therefore, agents can
still act with their decentralized individual policies, while exploiting
a larger joint policy space. Note that if agents do not follow the
signal and take stochastic individual policies, ΠS may be even
larger due to the additional variable z. However, this often results
in miscoordination of agents and is undesired. We illustrates the
relationship among different joint policy spaces in Fig. 1.
A practical concern is that according to the assumption, agents
need to assign every joint action to a specific z, which means that
the size ofZ is as large as A. Fortunately, the set of optimal joint
actions is often small, and hence an optimal πS needs only a small
subspace ofZ to instruct agents to take those optimal joint actions.
Besides, we can lower the complexity with neural networks as
demonstrate in Sec. 3.3.
In addition to our signal instructed method, previous works
[19, 22, 36, 39] also propose to introduce the communication mech-
anism, which encourages agents to coordinate in the decentral-
ized execution approach by exchanging communication vectors.
However, in communication agents have to execute three tasks to
accomplish successful coordination: sending meaningful signals
(signaling), receiving the right signal (receiving), and interpreting
it correctly (listening). [22] points out that the receiving process
suffers from the noisy channel problem, which arises when all other
agents use the same communication channel to simultaneously
send information to one agent. The agent needs to distinguish use-
ful information from useless or irrelevant noise. In addition, [30]
shows that successful signaling does not necessarily lead to effec-
tive listening. Therefore, it is not easy to explore better joint policy
through communication in complex scenarios. Unlike these peer-
to-peer communication approaches, the signal instructed approach
improves coordination in a top-to-bottom way. It circumvents sig-
naling and receiving issues, and focuses on listening stage as we
will discuss in the next section.
2.3 Signal Instructed Coordination
When a coordination signal is observed, how to incentivize agents
to follow its instruction and coordinate is a critical issue. As a
coordination signal is sampled from Pz and carries no state-dependent
information, it is possible for agents to treat it as random noise
and ignores it during the training process. Our idea is to facilitate
the coordination signal to be entangled with agents’ behaviours
and thus encourage the coordination in execution. We name our
method as Signal Instructed Coordination (SIC). SIC introduces an
information-theoretic regularization to ensure the signal makes
an impact in agents’ decision making. This regularization aims to
maximize the mutual information between the signal, z, and the
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joint policy, πS , given current state, s , as
I (z;πS (a, z |s)) = −H (πS |z) + H (πS )
= −H (πSi ,πS−i |z) + H (πS )
= −H (πSi |z) − H (πS−i |πSi , z) + H (πS ), (2)
where πS , πSi and π
S
−i are abbreviations for π
S (a, z |s), πSi (ai , z |s)
and πS−i (a−i , z |s), and πS−i and a−i are the joint policy and the joint
action of all agents except agent i respectively. The decomposition
of πS into πSi and π
S
−i in the second line holds in our decentralized
approach.
Through decomposing the regularization term in Eq. (2), one can
find that the effects for minimizing the mutual information between
signal and policy are threefold. Minimizing the first term increases
consistency between the coordination signal and the individual pol-
icy to suffice the assumption of Theorem 2.2. Minimizing the second
term ensures low uncertainty of other agents’ policies, which is ben-
eficial to establish coordination among agents. Maximizing third
term encourages the joint policy to be diverse, which prohibits the
opponents from inferring our policy in competition. These effects
in combination improves the performance of the joint policy. How-
ever, directly optimizing Eq. (2) is troublesome in implementation.
Considering the symmetry property of mutual information, we aim
to maximize
I (z;πS (a, z |s)) = −H (z |πS (a, z |s)) + H (z)
= Ez∼Pz,a∼π (a |s,z)[Ez′∼P (· |s,a) log P(z′ |s,a)]
+H (z), (3)
where π (a |s, z) is the Cartesian product of individual policies after
observing a specific z, and P(·|s,a) is the posterior distribution
estimating the probability of a specific signal z′ after seeing the
state s and the joint action a. Note that P(·|s,a) is not the same as
Pz . Since we have no knowledge of the posterior distribution, we
circumvent it by introducing a variational lower bound [3, 7, 29]
which defines an auxiliary distributionU (·|s,a) as:
Eq. (3) = Ez∼Pz,a∼π (a |s,z)[DKL(P(·|s,a)| |U (·|s,a)] +
Ez∼Pz,a∼π (a |s,z)[Ez′∼P (· |s,a) logU (z′ |s,a)] + H (z)
≥ Ez∼Pz,a∼π (a |s,z)[Ez′∼P (· |s,a) logU (z′ |s,a)], (4)
where U (z |s,a) is an approximation of P(z |s,a). The inequality
operator in the last line holds due to the non-negative property of
KL divergence and entropy as DKL(·) ≥ 0 and H (·) ≥ 0. Therefore,
we derive a mutual information loss (MI loss) from Eq. (4) as
LI (π ,U ) = −Ez∼PZ ,s∼τ ,a∼π (a |s,z) logU (z |s,a). (5)
where τ is trajectories of game episodes. Minimizing Eq. (5) facili-
tates agents to follow the instruction of the coordination signal.
Another important issue is how to model Pz . Using a discrete
signal space may raise differentiable problems in back-propagation
and increase model complexity when encoding signals as one-hot
vectors. Instead, we propose to adopt a continuous signal space,
and approximate Pz in a Monte Carlo way. In detail, we sample
a Dz -dimension continuous vector v from a normal distribution,
N(0, IDz×Dz ), and distribute it to all agents. v can be viewed as a
value of the variable z. Agents learn to divide the RDz space into
several subspaces, with each corresponding to one signal and hence
one optimal joint action. The probability of sampling a specific z,
Pz (z), is approximated by the probability of sampling a vector v
that belongs to the corresponding subspace.
To compute U (z |s,a), we use a centralized multi-layer feed-
forward network, named as U-Net, as a parameterized function,
fU . U-Net inputs s and a, and outputs a continuous vector with
the same dimension as z as the reconstructed signal z′ = fU (s,a).
U (z |s,a) is measured by the mean squared error between z′ and
z. One obvious advantage of SIC is that it can be easily integrated
with most existing models with policy networks, as shown in Fig.
2. We expect to optimize parameters of policy networks and U-net
concurrently by minimizing LI , so that the learned joint action
is an optimal one. However, if agents adopt stochastic policies as
in COMA, it is challenging to pass gradients to policy networks
through sampled a. Therefore, we use a simplified approximation
U (z |s,h), where h is the concatenation of last layers of hidden vec-
tors in policy networks. Parameters of the centralized U-net, ω,
and parameters of decentralized policies, θ = ⟨θ1,θ2, · · · ,θn⟩, are
jointly optimized as:
max
ω,θ
Eo∼τ ,a∼π ,z∼PZ [Qi (o,a |z) − αLI (π ,U )], (6)
where Qi (o,a |z) is the centralized critic function, and α > 0 is the
hyperparameter for information maximization term. Qi (o,a |z) can
also be substituted with the advantage function used by COMA.
We do not share parameters among agents. Note that oi may be
a partial observation of agent i , and additional communication
mechanism can be introduced to ensure theoretical correctness
of Eq. (5). However, we empirically show that in some partially
observable environments, e.g., particle worlds [31], where the agent
can infer global state from its local observation, SIC can still work
with oi . When applied to Multi-agent Actor-Critic frameworks [31],
the objective of updating critic remains unchanged.
3 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we firstly evaluate SIC on a simple Rock-Paper-
Scissors-Well game to see whether SIC encourages coordination
and thus leads to better performance. Then, we comprehensively
study SIC in more challenging Predator-Prey game under different
scenarios.
3.1 Rock-Paper-Scissors-Well
We use a 2 vs. 2 variant of the matrix game, Rock-Paper-Scissors-Well
[38], which is an extension to traditional Rock-Paper-Scissors. Each
team consists of two independent agents, and the available actions
of each agent are Access(A) and Yield(Y ). The joint action space
consists of (Y ,Y ), (Y ,A), (A,Y ), and (A,A), which can be named as
Rock , Paper , Scissors andWell . The former three actions play as
in the traditional Rock-Paper-Scissors game, whileWell wins only
against Paper and is defeated by Rock and Scissors. The payoffmatrix
is presented in Table 1.
Assume both teams are controlled by centralized controllers, the
best πC is P(Y ,Y ) = P(Y ,A) = P(A,Y ) = 13 and P(A,A) = 0, since
it is always better to take (Y ,A) instead of (A,A). To achieve this,
agents within the same team need to coordinate to avoid the disad-
vantaged joint action (A,A), and choose others uniformly randomly.
From a probabilistic perspective, the coordination requires high
correlation between teammates, otherwise either (A,A) is inevitable
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Policy U-Net
Signal distribution MI loss
= centralized component
= decentralized component = SIC
= gradient flow
?
Figure 2: Illustration of SIC. Black arrows indicate how vari-
ables are passed between components. Note that in U-Net,
we use the concatenation of last hidden vectors in policy net-
works h, instead of a, to enable gradient flowwhen adopting
stochastic policies.
Table 1: Payoff matrix of the 2 vs. 2 Rock-Paper-Scissors-
Well game. Both row and column players consist of two
agents, who coordinate with individual actions as Y or A to
play a joint action, e.g., Paper (Y, A), and receive shared re-
wards. Failed coordination will result in a bad joint policy
vulnerable to the opponent team.
Rock Paper Scissors Well
Y, Y Y, A A, Y A, A
Rock Y, Y (0, 0) (1, -1) (-1, 1) (1, -1)
Paper Y, A (-1, 1) (0, 0) (1, -1) (1, -1)
Scissors A, Y (1, -1) (-1, 1) (0, 0) (-1, 1)
Well A, A (-1, 1) (-1, 1) (1, -1) (0, 0)
to appear as long as π1(A) × π2(A) > 0, or the joint action space
degenerates to {(Y ,Y ), (Y ,A)} or {(Y ,Y ), (A,Y )}.
3.1.1 One-step Matrix Game. In the first scenario, we set the
length of each episode as one. We apply our SIC module to RE-
INFORCE algorithm, and denote it as SIC-RE. The team-shared
coordination signal z ∈ R2 is sampled from N(0, I ). Note that each
agent takes a stochastic policy, and signals received by the two
teams are different. After training, the four agents converge to an
equilibrium, with rewards of both row and column players equal to
0. To better study which kind of equilibrium agents have reached,
we randomly sample 5000 signals and test how agents respond to
(a) Row player (0 ep).
−→
(b) Row player (100k ep).
(c) Col player (0 ep).
−→
(d) Col player (100k ep).
Figure 3: Correlations between signal distribution and joint
actions. Each point represents a 2-dim signal, and red, green,
blue, and cyan represent the corresponding joint action as
(Y ,Y ), (Y ,A), (A,Y ), and (A,A) respectively. The frequency of
different actions in these 5000 points is shown above each
sub-figure.
them before and after training. Fig. 3 illustrates the joint policy of
both teams. We can see that
(1) Before training (a&c), the frequency of each joint action is
roughly 0.25 for both team, since each agent takes a ran-
dom individual policy. In addition, the distribution of signals
triggering different joint actions are quite spreading.
(2) After training (b&d), the signal space is roughly divided into
three “zones”, with each zone representing one joint action.
The “area” of each zone, i.e., the probability of sampling one
signal bolonging to the zone, is roughly 1/3, which indicates
that the result is close to the best performance a centralized
controller can achieve.
3.1.2 Multi-step Matrix Game. In the second scenario, we set
the length of the episode as 4 steps. We denote the matrix game
in Table 1 as M4, since we expect the fourth joint action to be
deprecated by agents. Then we generate a new matrix, Mi , by
exchanging the fourth row with the i-th row, and the fourth column
with the i-th column sequentially. In this way we obtain a set of
matrices M = {M1,M2,M3,M4}. We design a multi-step matrix
game, where two teams play according to a random payoff matrix
drawn fromM in each step. Each agent can only observe the ID
i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} of the current matrix and the coordination signal. To
simulate sparse rewards, we only give agents the sum of rewards
on each step after an episode of game is finished, and train them
with discounted returns.
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Figure 4: Average rewards of row players on 4-step matrix
game. We report reward curves of (i) SIC-RE vs. SIC-RE, (ii)
SIC-RE vs. IND-RE, and (iii) IND-RE vs. IND-RE with row
players trained by the former model.
To evaluate SIC-RE, we use REINFORCE algorithm with fully
independent agents as the baseline model, which we denote as IND-
RE. We conduct experiments and plot averaged reward curves of
row players in Fig. 4. We also plot joint policy curves of row players
in M4 (the same as Table 1) of SIC-RE vs SIC-RE and IND-RE vs
IND-RE in Fig. 5 to study their reached equilibrium. More curves
can be found in Appendix B. We can see that
(1) Even in multi-step scenarios with sparse rewards, coordi-
nation signal can still coordinate agents as the centralized
controller does. Fig. 5-a shows that joint policy of row play-
ers gradually converge to P(Y ,Y ) = P(Y ,A) = P(A,Y ) = 13
and P(A,A) = 0, and the response of row players is similar
to Fig. 3.
(2) Although IND-RE also reaches an equilibrium with a game
value as 0 in IND-RE vs. IND-RE as shown in Fig. 4 and
5-b, its ability to coordinate is limited, as it can only formu-
late joint policy in ΠD . Therefore, in direct competition as
SIC-RE vs IND-RE, IND-RE is outperformed and stuck in a
disadvantaged equilibrium with a negative averaged reward.
3.2 Predator-Prey
In this section, we evaluate SIC on Predator-Prey games [4, 31, 32],
which is a common task to study coordination of multi-player
games. We customize our Predator-Prey game based on the imple-
mentation in [31]. In this game,M slow predators andM fast preys
are randomly placed in a two-dimensional world with L = 2 large
landmarks impeding the way, and predators need to collaborate to
collide with another team of agents, preys. Each agent is depicted
by several attributes including its coordinates and velocity while
landmarks are depicted by the location only. The observation of
each agent includes its own attributes and egocentric attributes
of other agents and landmarks. The action of each agent contains
4 moving directions and a stop action. Whenever a collision hap-
pens, all predators are equally rewarded while all preys are equally
penalized immediately.
We use following baseline models as baselines:
(a) SIC-RE vs SIC-RE
(b) IND-RE vs IND-RE
Figure 5: Example joint policy curves of two settings in
multi-step matrix game.
(1) COMA [17]: Each agent learns an individual policy, πi (ai |τi ),
where τi is the local action-observation history, and a cen-
tralized action-value critic, Qi (o,a). The advantage function
used when updating policy networks, Ai (s,ai ,a−i ), is com-
puted as Qi (s,a) −∑ai πi (ai |τi )Qi (o,a).
(2) MADDPG [31]: Each agent learns a deterministic individual
policy, µi (ai |oi ) and a centralized action-value critic,Qi (o,a).
To make policies differentiable in the discrete action space,
we adopt the Gumbel-softmax trick as [31] does.
We integrate SIC with baselines and denote them as SIC-MA and
SIC-COMA. We use hyper-parameters of neural networks, like the
number of units and activation functions, in the original paper,
and inherit them in SIC variants. To evaluate the performance of
different models, we conduct cross-comparison among them and
report predator scores with 10 random seeds. The results are shown
in Table 2, where the bold value is the highest score in a row, and
the underlined value is the lowest score in a column. We can see
that:
(1) SIC-MA significantly outperforms all other models, both
as predators and preys. In addition, the application of SIC
presents stable improvements when integrated into different
models.
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Table 2: Cross-comparison among different models. Results are reported in terms of predator scores, which is proportional to
the number of collisions. Each row shows results against the same prey; the higher the score, the better the predator model,
and the bold value is the highest one. Each column shows results against the same predator; the lower the score, the better the
prey model, and the underlined value is the lowest one.
(a) 2 vs. 2 Predator-Prey game.
Preys
Predators COMA MADDPG SIC-COMA SIC-MA SIC-MA (w/o LI )
COMA 7.38 ± 2.58 132.27 ± 9.93 6.35 ± 1.87 139.27 ± 7.45 133.63 ± 7.22
MADDPG 0.37 ± 0.14 3.07 ± 0.65 0.56 ± 0.15 3.32 ± 0.47 3.14 ± 0.56
SIC-COMA 6.76 ± 1.18 139.37 ± 13.38 5.44 ± 1.04 145.11 ± 11.55 140.82 ± 15.11
SIC-MA 0.34 ± 0.14 2.81 ± 0.44 0.37 ± 0.14 3.15 ± 0.25 3.13 ± 0.44
(b) 4 vs. 4 Predator-Prey game.
Preys
Predators COMA MADDPG SIC-COMA SIC-MA SIC-MA (w/o LI )
COMA 21.8 ± 3.3 76.3 ± 12.7 25.3 ± 4.5 78.6 ± 13.1 75.9 ± 10.2
MADDPG 21.1 ± 2.2 41.3 ± 3.9 21.9 ± 2.6 42.2 ± 4.7 39.6 ± 6.6
SIC-COMA 20.1 ± 2.0 57.3 ± 8.8 21.6 ± 2.7 58.2 ± 8.4 56.5 ± 9.2
SIC-MA 20.5 ± 1.9 37.3 ± 3.7 21.2 ± 2.1 41.5 ± 5.2 38.8 ± 6.0
(2) Ablation analysis shows that LI is a strong constraint to
enforce agents to coordinate. Absence of LI is harmful to
the performance of models, although minor improvements
may be observed.
Besides comparing directly on the testing reward, we visualize
the distribution of collision positions in Fig. 6. We repeat MADDPG
vs. MADDPG, SIC-MA vs. MADDPG and MADDPG vs. SIC-MA
for 10000 games with different seeds. We reset each game to the
same state in each episode, and collect positions of collisions in
the total 250000 steps. We plot the density distribution of positions,
(x ,y), marginal distributions of x and y, and the initial particle
world in Fig. 6. Data points (x ,y)with higher frequency in collected
data are colored darker in the plane, and values of its components
x and y in marginal distributions is higher. Note that color and
height reflect density instead of the number of times, and cannot be
compared between sub-figures directly. In Fig. 6-a, most collisions
happen in the top or right parts around the upper landmark, which
reflects that both predators and preys as running to the top-left
corner. In Fig. 6-b, when SIC-MA controls preys, most collisions
happen in the middle to the bottom of the whole map, showing
that preys’ trajectories cover a large area. When SIC-MA plays
predators as in Fig. 6-c, collisions also appears in more diverse
positions, and we observe that the right predator sometimes drive
preys into the aisle between two landmarks, where the left predator
is ambushing to capture them. Specifically, 3806 and 2041 collisions
happen when SIC-MA controls predators and preys respectively
while 3068 collisions happen in MADDPG vs. MADDPG. In other
words, as predators, SIC captures more preys, and as preys, it avoids
being captured more effectively than MADDPG. This evidences
that SIC-MA learns better policies compared to MADDPG.
3.3 Parameter Sensitivity
We conduct a parameter sensitivity analysis by testing SIC-MA vs
MADDPG with different Dz in 2 vs. 2 predator-prey environment,
and report results in Fig. 7. Note that SIC-MA with Dz = 0 is equal
to MADDPG, and Dz = 20 is the setting used in Table 2. We can see
that SIC-MA presents a stable improvement over MADDPG. Most
importantly, empirical results show that approximation through
neural networks can compressZ and ensure good performance.
4 RELATEDWORKS
Unlike previous studies [6] on MARL that adopt tabular methods
and focus on coordination in simple environments, recent works
adopt deep reinforcement learning framework [27] and turn to
complex scenarios with high dimensional state and action spaces
like particle worlds [31] and StarCraft II [41]. Among different ap-
proaches to model the controlling of agents, centralized training
with decentralized execution [31, 35] outperforms others for cir-
cumventing the exponential growth of joint action space and the
non-stationary environment problem [27]. Emergent communica-
tion [30] is proposed to enhance coordination and training stability.
Communication allows agents to pass messages between agents and
“share” their observations via communication vectors. It is essential
to cooperative referential games [15, 31], or the non-situated envi-
ronment [42], where each agent has its own specialization as speaker
or listener and the exchange of information is crucial to the games.
A more widely-studied type of environments is the situated envi-
ronment, where agents have similar roles and non-communicative
actions. [36, 39] design special architectures to share information
among all agents. The noisy channel problem arises when all other
agents use the same communication channel to send information
simultaneously, and the agent needs to distinguish useful infor-
mation from useless or irrelevant noise. To alleviate this problem,
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(a) MADDPG vs MADDPG
(3068 collisions)
(b) MADDPG vs SIC-MA
(2041 collisions)
(c) SIC-MA vs MADDPG
(3806 collisions)
Figure 6: The density andmarginal distribution of collision’s positions, (x ,y), in 10000 repeated games.We repeat experiments
from the same randomly generated environment, with yellow, green and black circles representing predators, preys and land-
marks at the start of each game. The result shows that compared to MADDPG, SIC-MA presents more diverse strategy and
better performance both as predators and preys.
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Figure 7: Results of parameter sensitivity analysis on Dz .
[10, 19, 22] propose to introduce the attention mechanism to control
the bandwidth of different agents dynamically. However, communi-
cation requires large bandwidth to exchange information, and the
effectiveness of communication is under question as discussed by
[30].
The coordination problem [5], or the Pareto-Selection problem
[32], has been discussed by a series of works in fully cooperative
environments. The solution to the coordination problem requires
strong coordination among agents, i.e., all agents act as if in a
fully centralized way. In the game theory domain, it can also be
viewed as pursuingCorrelated equilibrium (CE) [2, 26], where agents
make decisions following instructions from a correlation device.
It is desired that agents in the system can establish correlation
protocols through adaptive learning method instead of constructing
a correlation device manually for specific tasks [18] proposes to
replace the value function in Q-learning with a new one reflecting
agents’ rewards according to some CE. [44] maintains coordination
sets and select coordinated actions within these sets. Apart from
these methods, centralized signal is adopted by a variety of works
[8, 9, 12].
Mutual information measures the mutual dependence between
two variables, and has been used to enforce an information the-
oretic regularization by a variety of works in different domains
[3, 7, 11, 29]. [7, 29] use it to model the relationship between latent
codes and outputs in generative models. [11] proposes to substitute
reward function with a mutual information objective to train poli-
cies unsupervisedly in the single-agent RL domain. It maximizes
mutual information between signal and state, and focuses on the
diversity of the learned policy.
A similar concept to our coordination signal is common knowl-
edge, which refers to common information, e.g., representations
of states, among partially observable agents. Common knowledge
is used to enhance coordination [16, 40] and combined with com-
munication [23]. Among them, [16] proposes MACKRL which in-
troduces a random seed as part of common knowledge to guide
a hierarchical policy tree. To avoid exponential growth of model
complexity, MACKRL restricts correlation to pre-defined patterns,
e.g., a pairwise one, which is too rigid for complex tasks.
5 CONCLUSIONS
We present the drawback of popular decentralized execution frame-
work, and propose a signal instructed paradigm, which theoretically
can coordinate decentralized agents as manipulated by a centralized
controller. We propose Signal Instructed Coordination (SIC), a novel
module to enhance coordination of agents’ policies in centralized
training with decentralized execution framework, SIC instructs
agents by sampling and sending common signals to cooperative
agents, and incentivize their coordination by enforcing a mutual
information regularization. Our analysis show with the help of
SIC, the joint policy of decentralized agents demonstrates better
performance.
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A EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A.1 2v2 Predator-Prey Experiment
In 2v2 Predator-Prey experiment, we adopt 4 different models:
MADDPG, SIC-MADDPG, COMA, SIC-COMA. For both MAD-
DPG and SIC-MADDPG, we use the same hyper-parameters with
the original MADDPG paper except for the learning rate which is
set to be 0.001 for MADDPG and 0.0005 for SIC-MADDPG. In SIC-
MADDPG, we add a 20-dimensional signal, a U-Net with a ReLU
MLP with 64 hidden units, and set the coefficient of MI loss to be
0.0001. In COMA, we use the Adam optimizer with a learning rate
of 0.00005. Gradient clipping is set to be 0.1. Both Actor and Critic
are parameterized by a two-layer ReLU MLP with 64 units per layer
which is the same with MADDPG. We adopt GAE with γ = 0.99
and λ = 0.8. We use a batch size of 1000. SIC-COMA adopts the
same hyper-parameters as in COMA and the same signal, U-Net
and MI loss with SIC-MADDPG. For all models, we train with 10
random seeds.
A.2 4v4 Predator-Prey Experiment
In 4v4 Predator-Prey experiment, We adopt the same models and
parameters with 2v2 case, with the modifications as follows: The
learning rates of MADDPG and SIC-MADDPG are both set to be
0.0005. The coefficient of MI loss in SIC-MADDPG is set to be 0.01
in 4v4 case.
A.3 Matrix Game Experiment
We conduct three multi-step matrix game experiments with SIC-RE
and IND-RE models. For both models, we use the Adam optimizer
with a learning rate of 0.0001. The policy network is parameterized
by a one-layer ReLU MLP with 8 hidden units. For SIC-RE models,
we use, a two-layer ReLU MLP with 8 hidden units as U-Net, and
set the coefficient of MI loss to be 0.01.
B VISUALIZATION FOR JOINT POLICY OF
MULTI-STEP MATRIX GAME
We plot the curves of joint policies of both row players and column
players in multi-step matrix games in Fig. 8, 9, and 10.
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Figure 8: Joint Policy of SIC-RE vs SIC-RE. During training, the i-th joint action in Mi is deprecated gradually, and all other
joint actions are sampled uniformly randomly.
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Figure 9: Joint Policy of SIC-RE vs IND-RE. SIC-RE adjusts its joint policy to counter that of IND-RE, and achieves a positive
game value.
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Figure 10: Joint Policy of IND-RE vs IND-RE. IND-RE only finds worse joint policy in the team-policy space, and in some cases
(M2 andM3), players play only one kind of joint action.
